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If your organization does not use UEFI Secure Boot on Linux systems, this transition does not affect your boot path. You can stop reading now.
If you do use Secure Boot, here is what you need to know. The Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA (Certificate Authority) 2011 expires on June 27, 2026 (June 26 local time in some time zones). Expiration alone does not stop anything from booting and does not render a system insecure. Existing 2011-signed shims keep working on systems that still trust the 2011 CA. The real risk is narrower: once an operating system vendor ships a shim signed only by the Microsoft UEFI CA 2023, any system whose firmware does not already trust the 2023 CA will fail to boot. The work for you is to confirm, before that update reaches your systems, that your systems trust the 2023 CA.
If you want the history of why a Microsoft certificate sits in the Linux Secure Boot path at all, skip to the end.
Terms used in this post
You may see three Microsoft Secure Boot certificate authorities discussed in 2026 guidance. This post focuses on the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011, which is the CA used for third-party UEFI boot applications such as the Linux shim. The other expiring Microsoft Secure Boot certificates are the Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011, which is used to authorize updates to Secure Boot databases, and the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011, which is used for Windows boot components.
The 2023 update also separates two uses that were both covered by the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011. The Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 is for third-party UEFI boot applications, including the Linux shim. The Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023 is for third-party option ROMs, such as firmware on some add-in cards. This post is about the Linux bootloader path, but physical systems that rely on signed option ROMs may need to check that path too.
Microsoft began returning 2023-signed Linux shim binaries to operating system vendors in October 2025, and since then a submitted shim comes back signed by both the 2011 CA and the 2023 CA. Once the 2011 CA expires, Microsoft can only sign with the 2023 CA.
In UEFI Secure Boot terminology, db is the allowed signature database, dbx is the forbidden or revoked signature database, and KEK contains keys that can authorize updates to db and dbx. SBAT is a shim ecosystem mechanism for revoking boot components by generation. SBAT is related to Secure Boot revocation, but it is separate from the CA expiration itself.
For brevity, the rest of this post uses operating system vendor to include Linux distributions and other vendors that ship and support Linux boot components. Microsoft returns signed shims to that submitting operating system vendor. It does not push shim updates to end users or IT departments. Those reach systems through the normal operating system, package, image, or platform update channels.
What is not happening
Expiration is not revocation, and it does not cause an immediate boot failure.
The 2011 CA expiring does not make existing 2011-signed shims stop booting on June 27, 2026. UEFI Secure Boot validates a signature against the trust database and revocation state, not against the certificate’s validity period. The image-validation process in the UEFI specification bases the decision on whether the image’s hash or signing certificate is present in the authorized database (db) and absent from the forbidden database (dbx). It does not check whether the certificate has expired. Firmware bugs are always possible, but expiration by itself should not invalidate an already-signed shim.
There is also no current plan to revoke the Microsoft UEFI CA 2011. Expiration means Microsoft can no longer sign new binaries with that certificate. Revocation would mean telling systems not to trust binaries signed with it. Revocation is not the plan.
For the same reason, do not remove the 2011 CA from a system’s Secure Boot db. Removing it strips that trust path. Removal is not required for this transition, and existing boot components may still depend on the 2011 CA.
No operating system vendor has to move to a 2023-signed shim on the expiration date. An operating system vendor may keep shipping a 2011-signed shim (if one is available), ship a 2023-only shim, or ship one carrying both signatures. That decision belongs to the operating system vendor.
What can break
The failure case is a mismatch between the shim signature and the firmware trust database. The moment to worry about is not the expiration date. It is when a system first receives a 2023-only shim.
That leaves a remediation window: the time between the expiration date and the first 2023-only shim reaching a given system. How long it lasts depends on your operating system vendor’s packaging decisions, any security fix that forces a new shim release, and how easily you can update firmware or VM Secure Boot state on the affected platforms.
The transition comes down to one table:
| Firmware trust database | 2011-only shim | 2023-only shim | Dual-signed shim |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 CA only | Boots, but depends on continued 2011 trust | Does not boot | Should boot |
| 2023 CA only | Does not boot | Boots | Should boot |
| Both 2011 and 2023 CAs | Boots | Boots | Boots |
The table is deliberately simple. Real systems also have dbx revocations, SBAT policy, firmware bugs, operating system vendor packaging choices, and platform-specific update paths. But this is the core compatibility problem.
Dual-signed shims help bridge the transition, because the same shim can validate through either CA. However, they are not a guarantee. Some firmware mishandles multiple signatures and evaluates only one of them, revocation and vendor support still apply, and the operating system vendor decides whether to ship and support a dual-signed shim at all.
This kind of failure happens early, before the operating system loads. Recovery means restoring a trusted boot path or following your operating system, hardware, or platform vendor’s recovery guidance. It is not a package rollback inside a running system.
Who should pay closest attention
This transition matters most where the operating system, firmware, and update path may not move together. If you run a maintained operating system on maintained hardware or a maintained virtualization platform, the normal vendor update path may handle most of it. Closer attention is worthwhile where that path is missing, delayed, customized, or hard to validate.
Older hardware is the first case. Some systems need a firmware update before they can trust the 2023 CA, and support can vary by model even within one hardware vendor’s portfolio. Check each model you operate rather than assuming one answer covers the fleet.
Long-lived virtual machines are the second. VM firmware is still firmware. A VM’s Secure Boot state depends on when it was created, which platform firmware it uses, and which UEFI variables have changed since. Firmware is not just another package update, so a long-lived VM may never have received the relevant firmware or database updates unless the administrator or platform applied them. Your cloud or virtualization provider should be able to say how the 2023 CA is handled for new VMs, existing VMs, and imported or custom images.
Older operating system releases need more careful validation. Some lack current Secure Boot tooling, current fwupd daemon behavior, or a supported path for updating UEFI trust databases. A command that works on one release may not be supported on another.
Custom fleets are their own category: systems built from custom images, frozen package mirrors, pinned bootloader versions, or local Secure Boot policy changes. The more an environment differs from the vendor’s default update path, the more you need to verify the actual firmware trust database and installed shim directly.
Smaller operating system vendors and long-tail distributions are worth checking too, especially if they submit shim updates infrequently or have not finished their 2023 signing transition. No single authoritative public list tells you which releases have completed this work.
Who is responsible for what
There is no single Linux Secure Boot owner who can make every system safe for the transition.
The operating system vendor controls which shim and boot components it ships. It also controls whether its update process checks the firmware trust database before installing a 2023-only shim.
The Linux community runs a community-driven shim-review process for shim submissions. That process is the primary review gate before an operating system vendor requests a Microsoft signature. It is not a support channel for individual systems or fleets.
The hardware vendor, firmware vendor, or virtual machine platform controls which trust anchors are present by default and how firmware updates are delivered. In a physical machine, that may mean a BIOS or firmware update. In a VM, it may mean platform firmware defaults, guest-visible UEFI variables, or a provider-specific remediation process.
Microsoft controls the Microsoft UEFI signing service and the Microsoft UEFI CAs. After shim-review approval, Microsoft verifies the submitter’s relationship to the operating system vendor, runs some additional checks, signs submitted shims, and returns the signed artifacts to the submitting operating system vendor. Microsoft does not choose when each operating system vendor ships a new shim to its customers.
Your organization controls the systems it administers. In practice, that means checking whether Secure Boot is enabled, checking which certificates are trusted, following guidance from the relevant operating system vendor, and following guidance from the hardware vendor or VM provider.
This is why the right answer for any specific system depends on its operating system vendor, hardware vendor, and platform. This post explains the model. Only those vendors can tell you what is supported for your systems.
What to check
The exact commands vary by operating system vendor, package set, and platform. Treat the examples below as illustrations, not guaranteed instructions for every Linux system. IT departments should validate commands against vendor documentation before using them in production automation.
At fleet scale, the useful starting point is an inventory rather than a one-time manual check. Useful fields include whether Secure Boot is enabled, which Microsoft UEFI CAs are present in the firmware trust database, which CA signed the installed shim, the operating system release, the hardware model or VM platform, the update channel, and whether the system comes from a custom image or vendor image.
Set up representative canary systems before any broad rollout. A canary set should cover the differences that matter in your fleet: hardware model, VM platform, operating system release, image lineage, and update channel. The aim is to avoid discovering a firmware or shim mismatch for the first time during a broad production update, not to build a new certification program.
First, check whether Secure Boot is enabled:
sudo mokutil –sb-state
If Secure Boot is disabled, this certificate transition does not affect that system’s current boot path.
Next, check which Microsoft UEFI CAs are in the firmware trust database:
sudo mokutil –db
Look for entries such as:
Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011Microsoft UEFI CA 2023
If both are present, the system is prepared for a future 2023-signed shim. If only the 2011 CA is present, check guidance from the relevant operating system vendor and platform provider before accepting a 2023-only shim update.
On physical systems, also check whether the platform relies on signed third-party option ROMs. Those may require the Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023 in addition to the Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 used for boot applications. This is another reason hardware guidance can vary by model.
Administrators can also inspect the signature on the shim currently installed on a system. On Enterprise Linux and related distributions, pesign is often used:
sudo dnf install pesign
sudo pesign -S -i /boot/efi/EFI/<vendor-or-distribution>/shimx64.efi
On Debian, Ubuntu, and related distributions, sbverify from sbsigntools is often used:
sudo apt install sbsigntools
sudo sbverify –list /boot/efi/EFI/<vendor-or-distribution>/shimx64.efi
The path to shim may differ. Some systems use a different EFI path, a different architecture suffix, or a different bootloader arrangement. Vendor documentation is the right source for exact commands.
How updates may be delivered
Many operating system vendors use the Linux Vendor Firmware Service (LVFS) and fwupd for firmware-related updates, including some UEFI Secure Boot database updates. Not every vendor enables the same tooling, and not every platform supports the same update mechanism.
Common examples include:
sudo fwupdmgr update
sudo fwupdmgr security
sudo fwupdmgr get-devices
Some systems may require a firmware update from the hardware vendor. Some may support a standalone UEFI database update. Some may not support a safe standalone update at all. Some hardware and firmware vendors block standalone database updates because earlier failures showed that the update could break systems.
Updating the Secure Boot allowed signature database (db) also depends on authorization from keys in KEK. That is one reason these updates often require cooperation from the firmware, hardware, or VM platform vendor. Administrators should not assume that possession of a certificate file is enough to update a system safely.
Do not force a Secure Boot database update just because a command exists. Follow the guidance for the specific hardware, VM platform, or operating system vendor. Forcing an update can force a physical reboot of a machine or destroy the system.
After the first inventory pass, keep watching the operating system vendor’s security advisories and bootloader package updates.
Questions for your vendors
The right questions depend on the system, but these are the kinds of answers IT departments should look for from operating system vendors, hardware vendors, and VM providers:
- Does this operating system release currently ship a 2011-signed, 2023-signed, or dual-signed shim?
- If the vendor plans to ship a 2023-only shim, will the update process check whether the system trusts the 2023 CA before installing it?
- How is the Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 delivered for this hardware model, VM platform, or image?
- Is a standalone Secure Boot database update supported, or must the update arrive through a firmware update?
- Does support vary by hardware model, firmware version, VM generation, image type, or operating system release?
- What should administrators monitor for shim, GRUB, SBAT,
db,KEK, ordbxupdates related to this transition? - What is the recommended validation path before broad deployment?
- What is the supported recovery path if a system receives an incompatible shim or firmware update and fails to boot?
What to do now
If an IT department administers Linux systems that use Secure Boot, the useful work is straightforward:
- Use the checks above to inventory Secure Boot state, trusted CAs, and installed shim signatures across representative systems.
- Identify the parts of the fleet most likely to diverge from default vendor paths, including older hardware, long-lived VMs, older operating system releases, custom images, and pinned bootloader packages.
- Read operating system, hardware, and VM provider guidance before accepting 2023-only shim updates or applying firmware and Secure Boot database updates.
- Test representative canary systems before rolling out shim or firmware changes broadly.
- Monitor operating system vendor advisories for shim and bootloader updates related to the transition.
- Avoid forcing low-level firmware or UEFI variable updates unless vendor guidance says to do so.
How Linux got here
UEFI Secure Boot was introduced to let firmware verify boot components before executing them. The firmware contains a trust database. If a bootloader is signed by a trusted certificate and is not blocked by revocation policy, the firmware can execute it.
In the PC ecosystem, Microsoft has long operated the signing infrastructure used by Windows and by many third-party UEFI boot components. Linux operating system vendors do not have Microsoft sign the Linux kernel directly. Instead, they use a small first-stage bootloader called shim.
The Linux shim is signed by Microsoft so firmware will start it. The shim then validates the next boot component, usually GRUB or another vendor-controlled bootloader, using keys controlled by the operating system vendor, not Microsoft. That structure lets Linux operating system vendors participate in the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem while keeping control over their own boot chains.
The shim code is developed publicly, and shim signing uses the community-run shim-review process before the Microsoft signing step. That split is important. The Linux community reviews shim submissions, and Microsoft operates the signing service that applies a signature firmware will trust.
The certificate rotation affects this first handoff. Firmware must trust the CA that signed shim. If a future shim is signed only by the 2023 CA, the firmware needs the 2023 CA in its trust database.
A system that keeps booting with a 2011-signed shim is not automatically broken or insecure on the expiration date. A system that moves to a 2023-signed shim needs to trust the 2023 CA; plan for that transition.