AzureFeeds

What happens when the agent itself becomes the threat? Not because of a prompt injection (ASI01) or tool misuse (ASI02), but because the Claude model produces […]

Your health data agent says: “Your sleep quality improved 23% this month compared to last month.” You adjust your bedtime routine, change your medication timing, or […]

Your AI agent depends on a chain of services. In my side project (Biotrackr), the chain looks like this: Claude API for reasoning, APIM for routing, […]

Biotrackr is a single-agent system. One agent, twelve tools, one identity. That is an architectural choice that eliminates an entire vulnerability class Insecure Inter-Agent Communication (ASI07). […]

Every time your AI agent saves a conversation, you’re creating a potential attack vector. ASI06 (Memory and Context Poisoning) asks a deceptively simple question: “can previous […]

Can your AI Agent run code? If not, you probably don’t think that unexpected code execution applies to you. However, this goes a lot deeper than […]

Your AI Agent’s security is only as strong as its weakest dependency. Whatever packages you are using within your agents, you’re trusting that those packages that […]

One of the challenges I faced developing an agent for my side project (Biotrackr) was how do I manage identity. Some AI Agents share the same […]

In my side project (Biotrackr), I have a chat agent that I use to query my data using natural language. This agent has 12 tools that […]

My side project (Biotrackr) now has an agent! It’s essentially a chat agent that interacts with my data generated from Fitbit, which includes data about my […]

The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026) identifies the most critical security risks facing AI agents. From prompt injection and tool misuse to identity abuse […]